Kantian Realism

75

Kantian Realism
Jake Quilty-Dunn
ant's claims that the objects of perception are appearances, "mere representations," and that we can never
perceive things in themselves, seem to mark him as
some sort of indirect realist. On the other hand, the
theory of perception outlined in the Critique of Pure
Reason is much closer to direct realism. As I will try to show,
there are two criteria for direct realism, one epistemological and
one ontological, and Kant’s theory strongly satisfies the former
while partially satisfying the latter. Kant's transcendental idealism, under this view, necessarily makes him a sort of direct realist, or as he put it, "empirical" realist.1 Two useful extremes in the
philosophy of perception are the positions taken by Thomas Reid
and the school of Scottish Common Sense on one hand, and by
David Hume and the school of British Empiricism on the other. I
will argue that Kant’s theory entails that we are directly, immediately aware of real external objects that, though they are the
products of mental processes and therefore subject to "epistemic
conditions,"2 do nonetheless occupy external space and are not
simply mental entities. This theory matches the direct realism of
Thomas Reid in important ways and eschews the skeptical phenomenalism of Hume, the idealism of Berkeley, and the indirect
realism of Locke (the last three of which rely on the notion that
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the true objects of perception and thought are mental entities or
states called “ideas” or “perceptions”). After outlining criteria in
section I for a theory of direct realism, I will argue that Kant
holds that we have direct perception of external objects that exist
even when unperceived, and that his theory is remarkably similar to that of the most well-known direct realist in his lifetime,
Thomas Reid. If these arguments succeed, then Kant should be
regarded as some kind of direct realist.
I.
First, it should be made clearer what is meant by “direct realism,” and by the above distinction between epistemological and
ontological realism. Epistemological realism is here taken to be
the claim that the objects of perception are actually things like
books and chairs, rather than images that resemble them or other
mental intermediaries that indicate or imply them. Ontological
realism is the claim that physical objects like books and chairs
exist mind-independently. Direct realism is the conjunction of
these two claims. Locke’s representational realism would deny
epistemological realism (instead claiming that we only perceive
ideas in the mind) but affirm ontological realism. An idealist theory might affirm epistemological realism but deny ontological
realism. Thomas Reid’s direct realism would affirm both, and
global skepticism would deny both. To figure out where Kant fits
into all of this, we have to further distinguish two types of ontological realism—the type that says these objects and their properties exist even when they are not perceived, and the type that
says these objects exist independently of any facts about our
minds. The second type of ontological realism is what Kant
means by “transcendental realism.” Transcendental realism encompasses ontological realism, but goes further by excluding
mental facts altogether. Kant, I argue, would affirm both epistemological realism and ontological realism, on the stipulation that
ontological realism is not taken to mean transcendental realism.
This distinction between ontological and transcendental realism would not have been necessary before Kant’s argument that
our forms of intuition and understanding shape the empirical
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world. To say that a thing owes its existence to the fact that it
conforms to our forms of intuition, and not whether it is in fact
perceived, is the novel thesis that I will try to show Kant put
forth in the Critique of Pure Reason. If this is an accurate reading of
his theory, then extending the definition of ontological realism to
exclude this thesis would be in part to redefine ontological realism as “not what Kant believed.” It is more instructive to look at
what the term would mean in the context of pre-Kantian philosophy, and see where he seems to fit in.
Before the Critique of Pure Reason, the preeminent alternatives
to ontological realism were Berkeley’s immaterialism and
Hume’s mitigated skepticism. Berkeley and Hume attacked the
alleged independent existence of unperceived substances and the
continued existence of an object even when it is not perceived—
in other words, the elements of Locke’s philosophy that made
Locke an indirect realist rather than a mere idealist. If ontological
realism is taken to be merely the claim that empirical objects exist
with all their properties when unperceived, then Kant may in
fact be an ontological realist. Given his desire to justify science
and his commitment to “empirical realism,” his theory probably
does not entail that the Andromeda galaxy is not there when nobody is looking at the sky. Rather, for Kant, the Andromeda galaxy exists in virtue of its conformity to human forms of intuition
and understanding. This means that although humans and their
forms must exist in order for the Andromeda galaxy to exist, it
does not, I argue, exist at time t in virtue of its being directly perceived by some human at t (as an empirical idealist might say).
The claim that he really was an ontological realist, however, has
to be evaluated by looking at the text. In any case, we can distinguish between two kinds of direct realism: strong direct realism,
the conjunction of epistemological and transcendental realism;
and weak direct realism, the conjunction of epistemological and
ontological realism. If Kant is both an ontological and epistemological realist, then he is a weak direct realist. What remains to be
shown is what kind of realist he actually is.
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II.
The second of Kant’s Postulates of Empirical Thought in General is that “that which is bound up with the material conditions
of experience, that is, with sensation, is actual.”3 This postulate
could be seen as worryingly close to a denial of ontological realism. Once we examine what he means by it, however, it is clear
that it is transcendental realism, rather than ontological realism,
that is excluded by it.
The postulate bearing on the knowledge of things as actual does not, indeed, demand immediate perception (and,
therefore, sensation of which we are conscious) of the object whose existence is to be known. What we do, however, require is the connection of the object with some actual
perception, in accordance with the analogies of experience, which define all real connection in an experience in
general.4
The fact that a thing is actual does not depend on whether it is
being perceived. This is a straightforward affirmation of ontological realism and a denial of Berkeley’s motto, esse est percipi. It is
necessary that there be some perception that leads us to suppose
that the object exists—“the connection of the object with some
actual perception”—but this is only to say that we must have
some empirical justification for an empirical claim. The analogies
alluded to are important here, and they are as follows: first, that
substance is permanent amid changes;5 second, that every event
adheres to the law of causality;6 and third, that substances in
space stand in “thoroughgoing reciprocity”7 or “mutual interaction.”8
To say that our ascription of actuality to an unperceived object must be connected to an actual perception in accordance
with these analogies, therefore, is to say that we must (in principle) be able to infer its actuality from the causal connections of
interacting substances, and that this inference must at some point
be based on an actual perception. In other words, we do not actually have to perceive a thing in order to know that it exists, we
merely have to perceive something that implies its existence ac-
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cording to basic laws, “the principles of...empirical connection.”9
Kant gives the example of the perceived behavior of iron filings suggesting the existence of a “magnetic matter pervading all
bodies, although the constitution of our organs cuts us off from
all immediate perception of this medium.”10 Kant affirms the actuality of unperceived forces based on their being implied by
previous perceptions; Berkeley, on the other hand, denies that
such things (gravity, for instance) exist, because they are imperceptible by nature.11 Furthermore, Kant says that it must be admitted, “that there may be inhabitants in the moon, although no
one has ever perceived them.”12 It appears definitive that for
Kant, an object’s existence in the empirical world does not depend on its being actually perceived—that is, that Kant is an ontological realist. If Kant was an epistemological realist as well as
an ontological one (i.e., a weak direct realist); then we should expect his theory to have important aspects in common with wellknown direct realist theories, which brings us to Thomas Reid.
III.
Kant's theory of perception, insofar as perception is to be defined, is essentially identical to Reid's. Kant says in the BDeduction that perceptions are simply "representations accompanied by sensation."13 Kant defines "representation" as the genus
of mental acts under which sensations, concepts, and intuitions
are classified.14 Since in the relevant cases intuition implies sensation, it would be redundant to say that intuition and sensation
are necessary for perception.15 Furthermore, intuition must be
synthesized under concepts in order to yield a perceptible representation (more on this later); so it must be conception, rather
than intuition, that combines with sensation to constitute perception. I therefore take representation in this context to mean the
conception of a thing, and so perception of x is, for Kant, the representation or conception of x coupled with and initiated by a
present sensation. Reid often refers to "that conception and belief
of the external object, which we call perception.”16 There seems
to be a difference here, namely that Reid puts belief in the role
that sensation fills for Kant. However, it can be shown that Reid's
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account of perception also reduces to conception and sensation.
There are, for Reid, three necessary elements of perception of
x: the conception of x, the belief in the present existence of x, and
the condition that said belief is immediate and non-inferential. It
is clear for Reid that mere conception of x does not entail the belief in the existence of x. He and Kant are in complete agreement
on this point: "In the mere concept of a thing no mark of its existence is to be found."17 Reid's "faculty" of conception
is not employed solely about things which have existence. I can
conceive a winged horse or a centaur, as easily and as distinctly as I can conceive a man whom I have seen. Nor
does this distinct conception incline my judgment in the
least to the belief, that a winged horse or a centaur ever
existed.18
The belief in the legitimacy of the conception (i.e., the existence of the thing conceived) cannot, therefore, come from the
concept itself, but must find its origin elsewhere. Reid also says
that "we perceive no object, unless some impression is made upon the organs of sense."19 Since perception is defined above as the
combination of conception and belief, and since sensation of x is
the only other necessary condition for perception of x, and finally
since belief cannot come from conception, then belief in x's existence must come from sensation. We see as a result that Reid's
theory holds that perception is the combination of conception
and sensation. This definition is identical to Kant's. Therefore, at
least in terms of what is meant by the word perception, there is
no daylight between Kant and Reid.
Kant argues in the Analytic of Concepts that concepts are
necessary for all perceptual experience. This conclusion is due to
several assumptions on Kant’s part, chief of which is the idea
that experience is a kind of judgment or knowledge, specifically
of the empirical kind.20 The necessary conditions for judgments
in general should therefore be part of the conditions for experience as well. According to Kant, “all judgments are functions of
unity among our representations.”21 Allison explains that for
Kant, the “unification of representations in a judgment, which
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provides a determinate content for thought, occurs by bringing
these representations under a concept.”22 When we make a judgment of the form “A is B,” we do not simply consider A and consider B, we synthesize the two concepts into a unified judgment.
According to Kant, this synthetic unity can only be achieved by
means of concepts, which function as the necessary rules according to which such synthesis proceeds.23 Furthermore, “the same
function which gives unity to the various representations in a
judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition.”24 Acts of conception are therefore necessary to unify the synthetic judgments of perception and relate
them to an object. For Reid, conception is also necessary for the
judgments (i.e., beliefs) that constitute perception: “there can be
no belief without conception.”25
This congruence is a significant point of overlap. We can imagine a spectrum of perceptual theory with Reid and his twopart theory (i.e., sensation and conception) at one end and Hume
and Berkeley with their sensory-input-only theory at the other.
Reid believes that sensation alone presents us with no objects,
and that acts of conception are required to give us an external
object rather than mere blind feeling, as sensation “has no object
distinct from itself.”26 Kant falls squarely with Reid in his account of the necessary and sufficient elements of perception.
Kant, like Reid, has no need for the veil of perception, because,
unlike Reid, he believes that the transcendental ideality of space
and time eliminates certain problems that are posed by the assumption that things in themselves exist spatiotemporally independently of our epistemic conditions. Kant believes, in fact, that
one must choose between empirical realism and transcendental
realism.
Kant writes that Berkeleyan or empirical "idealism is unavoidable, if space be interpreted as a property that must belong
to things in themselves."27 When space is said to have “objective
reality,” we are confronted with absurdity, “in that two infinite
things, which are not substances, nor...inhering in substances,
must yet have existence...and moreover must continue to exist,
even although all existing things be removed[.]”28 Thus, Kant
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argues, if we ascribe transcendental reality to space and time, the
concept of matter becomes absurd, and “we cannot blame the
good Berkeley for degrading bodies to mere illusion.”29 This
“degrading [of] bodies to mere illusion” is empirical idealism in
a nutshell. Kant contrasts his own theory with Berkeley’s, and
claims that, “I am not saying that bodies merely seem to be outside me...[and it] would be my own fault, if out of that which I
ought to reckon as appearance, I made mere illusion.”30 Later on,
Kant says that it would be “unjust” to call his theory empirical
idealism, “which, while it admits the genuine reality of space,
denies the existence of the extended beings in it.”31 Transcendental idealism, “on the contrary, admits the reality of the objects of
outer intuition…[f]or since space is a form of that intuition which
we entitle outer, and since without objects in space there would
be no empirical representation whatsoever, we can and must regard the extended beings in it as real.”32 Thus it is false to say
that Kant thinks that outer existence is a “mere illusion,” because
insofar as things are empirical objects, they really do have the
spatiotemporal qualities they seem to have.
A possible objection to this direct realist reading of the
"conception plus sensation" definition could be that all this tells
us is that these concepts are what we perceive, and sensation
merely gives us an especially lifelike version of the concept. This
account would shift Kant's position closer to Hume’s. Kant's concepts and the schemata that underlie them, however, are not images (as this objection suggests), but rules of thought.
No image could ever be adequate to the concept of a triangle in general. It would never attain that universality of
the concept which renders it valid of all triangles, whether right-angled, obtuse-angled, or acute-angled... The concept 'dog' signifies a rule[.]33
Concepts are not the typical objects of perception or of thought
because they partially constitute the acts of both perception and
thought (though in philosophical contexts we may think about
concepts). The categories "think objects in general, without regard to the special mode (the sensibility) in which they may be
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given[.]"34 It is not the concepts that are intuited through sensibility, but the objects that they think. The objects that the concepts
are about are directly "given" in perception; again, Kant shares
Reid's view.
IV.
This similarity between Reid and Kant comes in part from
their denials of the continuum of vivacity between impressions
and ideas. While this terminology is undeniably Humean, the
same doctrine goes back to Locke and appears in nearly identical
form in Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge, along with the
principle that mental ideas are copied from ideas of sense that
are "imprinted" on the body.35 This notion of conception being a
faded or enervated form of sensation is summarily rejected by
Reid and Kant, who view the two as separate faculties that yield
different information and must be combined in perception. Both
thinkers saw a clear break where the so-called British Empiricists
saw a continuum. This distinction between sensation and conception, and the doctrine that both faculties are necessary for
perception, is one of Kant's great breakthroughs in philosophy;
yet the similarity of Reid's and Kant's accounts of perception outlined above shows that Reid had already made a more rudimentary version of this logical distinction (and yet necessary coupling) while Kant was still in his "pre-Critical" period.36
Another spectrum we might call to mind is that between the
empiricist, who in Kant's view wants to reduce knowledge and
concepts to sensory experience, and the rationalist, who (again in
Kant's view) wants to elevate sensory experience to the level of
concepts and the intellect. Kant clearly views the history of philosophy in this way and famously describes Leibniz, the consummate rationalist, as having "intellectualised appearances, just as
Locke, according to his system of noogony...sensualised all concepts of the understanding, i.e. interpreted them as nothing more
than empirical or abstracted concepts of reflection."37 On this
spectrum, Reid and Kant again occupy proximate positions,
though this time they are in the middle rather than at one end.
Kant's "middle path" in the theory of knowledge, namely that an
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innate intellectual organization (rationalism) combines with contingent sensory experience (empiricism) to produce knowledge,
has already been chipped at, if not completely "cut," by Reid.
Reid denies Hume's claim that any concept must have a corresponding impression which resembles it; for the sensations you
get from the hardness and extension of an object are as different
from those qualities themselves "as pain is to the point of a
sword."38
In other words, according to Reid, it is false to claim from the
constant conjunction of (for example) the sensation of hardness
with the primary quality of hardness that there is an equivalence
or resemblance between that quality and our sensation of it. Reid
points out (following Berkeley) that there is no way that a feeling
can resemble a quality such as hardness, and therefore that the
concept of hardness is not simply abstracted from the sensation,
but rather that our minds are constituted in such a way that we
understand (noninferentially) that the sensation of hardness
comes about because of the primary quality.39 Concepts, under
Reid's system, are only given to us through sense experience, but
we could not have them if we were not born fluent in the language of nature, to use his analogy.40 The sensation functions as
a sign of the quality. Just as the word "hardness" leads to the conception of the quality of hardness, the sensation we experience
when we touch a hard thing naturally suggests to us the quality
of hardness in the felt object.41 The concept of hardness, therefore, doesn't enter the mind until it holds the corresponding but
non-resembling sensation; your mind reads this natural sign, and
this causes your perception (conception and belief) of hardness
as a primary quality of the object.42 Kant’s pure concepts, on the
other hand, are in the understanding prior to all experience.43
Nevertheless, Reid and Kant are more similar to each other on
this issue than either is to Locke or to Leibniz because Reid and
Kant hold that the natural organization of the mind combined
with sensory experience is what allows us to consciously possess
concepts and to perceive objects through the application of those
concepts.
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V.
Comparisons with Reid aside, a central reason for my assertion that Kant is an epistemological realist is that Kant does not
say that perception of x entails that we perceive any intermediating entities, insofar as x is an empirically real object. The
“Refutation of Idealism” is a short but extremely important section added to the CPR in the second edition. Kant sought to refute the idea that we are first conscious of our own inner states
and then must infer the existence of outer objects. The fault of
Berkeley, Descartes, et al., is that they “assumed that the only
immediate experience is inner experience, and that from it we
can only infer outer things.”44 If he were an indirect realist, however, he would defend this idea. He argues that we do not perceive our representations and then refer them to an object, but
that we directly perceive the outer objects: “Thus perception of
this permanent is possible only through a thing outside me and
not through the mere representation of a thing outside me.”45 The
representation is not some inner mediating mental entity like a
Lockean/Cartesian idea, but rather it is the state of referral of
sensation to the outer object, the intentional act by which we are
presented immediately with such outer objects. The concept of
“referral” comes from the Transcendental Aesthetic, where Kant
argues for the ideality of space by saying that it must be presupposed “in order that certain sensations be referred to something
outside me.”46 Representation, then, is precisely this referral of
the sensation to the outer object, and it is not the act or inner
state of referring (i.e., the representation) that is the object of our
perception, but rather the external object to which the sensation
is referred—in other words, “outer experience is really immediate.”47 Self-consciousness of the Cartesian sort is in fact mediated
by outer perception, not the other way around (as indirect realism might have it), and the “determination of my existence in
time is possible only through the existence of actual things which
I perceive outside me.”48
The claims that “outer experience is really immediate”—
when “outer experience” means experience of outer objects with
rich spatial qualities such as being “outside me” and “outside
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and alongside [other objects]”—and that objects are “actual
things which I perceive outside me” are unambiguous expressions of epistemological realism. Kant’s theory of perception thus
fulfills our criteria for weak direct realism in that the objects of
perception are “outer” in a rich, three-dimensional sense, and in
that these objects are “permanent,” as they persist, independently, even when not perceived. As he claims that we immediately
and non-inferentially perceive actual objects in space, it is fair to
call him a weak direct realist. Furthermore, we might expect that
a weak direct realist would share salient features of his theory of
perception with the theories of other direct realists, and the discussion of Thomas Reid, perhaps the predominant (strong) direct
realist in early modern philosophy, shows this to be the case.
While Kant famously asserts that we have no knowledge of
things in themselves—a position that would likely get Reid's
teeth grinding—this is only so far as they are non-spatiotemporal
noumena, the unknowable unconditioned. Once our mental
forms of perception have synthesized a sensible object, we indeed have direct access to it, though the synthesis itself is a
“blind…function of the soul…of which we are scarcely ever conscious.”49 Despite the hiddenness of the means by which we represent objects, the process yields an object of which we are directly aware. “All outer perception...yields immediate proof of something real in space, or rather is the real itself. In this sense empirical realism is beyond question.”50
Sensible objects are themselves "mere representations," but
they are three-dimensional and “outside me,”51 and we have direct epistemological access to them. As Allison notes, Kant's use
of the term representation in this context has led to the "standard
picture" that his transcendental idealism results in some form of
empirical idealism or representationalism.52 According to Kant,
perception is nothing but conception and sensation, and there is
no intermingling "idea," as Locke would have us believe. In other
words, we do not see a tree by means of seeing something else;
we directly perceive a tree, through our conception of "a tree"
accompanied by a visual "sensation" that indicates to us that this
conception is of a presently existing object. For Kant, the objects
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of perception are empirically real outer objects, and owe their
existence not to the fact that a person is looking at them at a particular time, but rather to the fact that they conform to our forms
of intuition and therefore could possibly be the object of a person’s experience. In contrast to the idealist who asserts that objects exist only insofar as they are perceived, Kant’s theory entails that objects exist insofar as they are objects capable of being
perceived, or as he puts it, “objects of possible experience.”53 And
this capability, which constitutes their status as "mere representations," refers not to any mental entities of perception, but to the
way we perceive external objects, and therefore to the epistemic
conditions (i.e., forms of intuition and understanding) that distinguish Kant's transcendental idealism from the "dogmatic idealism of Berkeley" and the "problematic idealism of Descartes."54
In the end, empirical objects, as spatiotemporal and categorized phenomena, are "given" directly to us through intuition. It
appears that the appeal of viewing Kantian phenomena through
an idealist notion of "representations," though seductive, is superficial and inconsistent with how Kant describes the process of
perception. The outer objects themselves, not the representations
or conceptions of them, are given to us in experience. It is clear
from the above that Kant and Reid share fundamental views on
epistemology and perception. If the structural similarities between Reid and Kant really exist and have the significance I’ve
attached to them; if this account of the direct "givenness" and
permanence of empirical objects is accepted as an accurate reading of the text; and if my definitions of and distinctions between
different kinds of realism are correct, then it must be accepted
that Kant was a weak direct realist.
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Notes

1 CPR,

A28/B44
term is taken from Allison 1983.
3 CPR, A218/B266
4 CPR, A225/B272
5 CPR, B224
6 CPR, B232
7 CPR, B256
2 This

8 CPR,

A211

9 CPR,

A225/B273
CPR, A226/B273
11 The denial of gravity is found in the first of the Three Dialogues.
Berkeley, 29
12 CPR, A493/B521
13 CPR, B147
14 CPR, A320/B376
15 Pure intuition might qualify as a case of intuition without sensation, but that exception is not relevant here, where the issue is
empirical perception.
16 EIP, 212
17 CPR, A225/B272
18 EIP, 267
19 EIP, 36. See also: IHM, 44
20 CPR, B147: “empirical knowledge…is what we entitle experience.” B166: “But empirical knowledge is experience.”
21 CPR, A69/B93
22 Allison, 116
23 CPR, A105-6
24 CPR, A79/B105
25 EIP, 172
26 EIP, 133
27 CPR, B274
28 CPR, B70-1
29 CPR, B71
30 CPR, B69
31 CPR, A491/B519
10
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CPR, A491-2/B520
CPR, A141/B180
34 CPR, A254/B310
35 The relevant passage is found in Sec. 33 of Berkeley’s Principles.
Berkeley, 37
36 I have so far only quoted from Reid's EIP, which was published in 1785, after the first edition of Kant’s CPR (which was
published in 1781), but the point about sensory impressions and
the concepts we gain from them being different entities entirely
(and thus not simply more or less forceful versions of each other)
is argued strongly and repeatedly in Reid's 1764 IHM (especially
in Ch. 5, "Of Touch") and is central to the critique of empiricist
idea doctrine in that work.
37 CPR, A271/B327
38 IHM, 60
39 Ibid.
40 IHM, 59, 85
41 IHM, 57-8
42 IHM, 64-5
43 CPR, A65-6/B90
44 CPR, B276
45 CPR, B275
46 CPR, A23/B38
47 CPR, B276
48 CPR, B275-6
49 CPR, A78/B1-3
50 CPR, A375
51 CPR, A23/B38
52 Allison, 26-27
53 CPR, B148
54 CPR, A226/B274
32
33
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